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"Knock and Talk" and the Fourth Amendment
CRAIG M. BRADLEY*
INTRODUCTION
One of the surprising things about the Republican Supreme Court's I criminal
procedure jurisprudence is its concern for the privacy of the home. While the Court
over thirty-five-plus years of Republican domination has been generally pro-police
when it comes to outdoor searches as well as interrogations, it has been rather steadfast
in protecting the home from warrantless intrusions by police. Even such minor
intrusions into the home as monitoring a beeper located inside a drum of chemicals 2
and measuring the heat emissions of a house from outside the home3 have required a
search warrant. Likewise, arrests made inside a dwelling must be performed pursuant
to an arrest warrant.
4
But there is a large swath of police activity that intrudes into dwellings that has been
widely allowed by the courts and that often renders the search and arrest warrant
requirements nugatory. This is the "knock and talk" technique. Under "knock and
talk," police go to people's residences, with or without probable cause, and knock on
the door to obtain plain views of the interior of the house, to question the residents, to
seek consent to search, and/or to arrest without a warrant, often based on what they
discover during the "knock and talk." When combined with such other exceptions to
the warrant requirement as "plain view," consent, and search incident to arrest, "knock
and talk" is a powerful investigative technique.
This Article explains how "knock and talk," as approved by numerous United States
courts of appeal as well as many state courts,5 has severely limited the Fourth
Amendment protection afforded to homes, despite the Supreme Court's stance that
homes are heavily protected. Indeed, even though considerable disagreement exists
among lower courts as to the extent of the "knock and talk" doctrine, it has never been
directly discussed by the Court. However, what was essentially a "knock and talk" was
considered and disapproved of in the often quoted, but no longer fully adhered to, 1948
case of Johnson v. United States.6
This Article argues that the lower courts, as well as the Supreme Court, should
return to the principles that Johnson announced. It proposes three possible solutions to
the intrusiveness that the "knock and talk" technique imposes on the home in
descending order of severity. The first is to ban "knock and talk" entirely when a
particular home or suspect is the focus of police investigation. The second is to allow
* Robert A. Lucas Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law -
Bloomington.
1. The Court has had a Republican majority since Lewis Powell was sworn in on January
7, 1972. See SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL Soc'Y, MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES (2006), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf.
2. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
3. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
4. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
5. This Article is based largely on recent circuit court decisions, but there are many more
federal district and state court decisions that deal with this issue as well.
6. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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"knock and talk," but to forbid police from using it as a means of avoiding the search
and arrest warrant requirements. The third is to require warnings before police can seek
consent to search homes or to arrest people at home without a warrant. The details and
relative merits of these proposals are discussed in the last Part.
I. SPECIAL PROTECTION FOR THE HOME
One of the Supreme Court's favorite Fourth Amendment pronouncements is that
"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."
7
But as Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment in California v. Acevedo, pointed
out in 1991, "[e]ven before today's decision, the 'warrant requirement' [has] become
so riddled with exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable."6 Acevedo itself
exacerbated the trend by holding that a piece of personal luggage or any other
container found in a vehicle can be searched on probable cause with no warrant.9
In addition to the vehicle search exception to the warrant requirement, no warrant is
required to arrest someone in a public place,' 0 to fully search them incident to that
arrest, including any containers they might be carrying, " or to "stop and frisk" them. 12
In fact, after Acevedo, there is nothing left of the search warrant requirement for
outdoor searches except for the perishingly small group of individuals whom police
lack probable cause to arrest, who are carrying a container that police have probable
cause to believe contains evidence of a crime, and who do not place the container in a
vehicle. 13 These containers alone remain subject to the search warrant requirement. 14
Moreover, during the 1970s and 1980s, the Court was vigorous in declaring various
police activities that could only be described as "searches" in common parlance as not
constituting "searches" at all under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, a search of an "open
field" surrounded by a fence and "No Trespassing" signs, 15 a helicopter flyover
conducted to look for marijuana growing in a yard, 16 and a search of trash left at the
7. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,357 (1967) (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
8. 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing Craig M. Bradley, Two
Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468, 1473-74 (1985) (setting forth twenty
exceptions to the warrant requirement)).
9. See id. at 580.
10. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,423-24 (1976).
11. The combined impact of United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that a
search incident to arrest includes "full body search" of arrestee as well as search of a cigarette
pack found on his person), and Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (holding that backpack
of arrestee may be fully searched at the police station pursuant to routine police administrative
procedure), leads to this conclusion.
12. SeeTerryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
13. See Craig M. Bradley, The Court's "Two Model" Approach to the Fourth Amendment:
Carpe Diem!, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 442 (1993) (discussing the erosion of the
warrant requirement for searches conducted outside the home).
14. See id.
15. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
16. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
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curb for pickup 17 were all deemed "non-searches" and consequently not subject to
Fourth Amendment regulation at all, much less the warrant requirement.
But throughout the same period that the Court was whittling away at the warrant
requirement, and at the scope of the Fourth Amendment itself, it remained protective of
the home. As noted, in the 1984 case of United States v. Karo, the Court, somewhat
surprisingly, held that a search warrant is required in order for police to continue to
monitor an electronic signal from a beeper concealed in a drum of chemicals after the
drum was taken inside a house.18 After the 1980 case of Payton v. New York, an arrest
warrant is required to enter a home to arrest the occupant. 19 In 1981, the Court held
that a search warrant is required to seek an arrestee in a third party's home. 0 The Court
even held that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement does not
apply to warrantless entries into the home to arrest for minor offenses21 and imposed a
"knock and announce" requirement on police who are executing search warrants for the
home.22
Finally, in a truly striking display of the protection accorded to the home, the Court
in Kyllo v. United States held that beaming a thermal imaging device at a home
required a warrant, even though the device only detected the heat emissions from the
home.23 The dissenters, noting that heat emissions could be detected by observing the
pattern of snow melting on the roof, disagreed only to the extent that the information
that was disclosed by the device about the inside of the home was extremely minimal,
and would have upheld the warrant requirement had there been a significant intrusion
into the home.24 The majority insisted, however, that "obtaining by sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise
have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area'
constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in
general public use."
25
This concern for privacy in the home is, of course, at the root of the Fourth
Amendment itself.26 It is reflected in the 1886 case of Boyd v. United States, which
held that the Fourth Amendment's prohibitions apply
[To all invasions on the part of the government and its employ6s [sic] of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the
17. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
18. 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984).
19. 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).
20. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1981).
21. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984).
22. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995). However, in Hudson v. Michigan, 547
U.S. 586 (2006), the Court effectively took back this requirement by declaring that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of Wilson. These two cases were about the
execution of warrants and did not affect the warrant requirement itself.
23. 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
24. See id. at 43-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 34 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
26. See generally JACOB W. LANDYNSKi, SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 25-30 (1966) (describing the history of the Fourth
Amendment).
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offence [sic]; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property .... 27
Likewise, in the 1914 case of Weeks v. United States,28 the Court declared that
evidence seized unconstitutionally cannot be used in a federal criminal trial:
If letters and private documents [could]... be [unlawfully] seized [from a home
without a warrant] and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense,
the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against
such searches and seizures is of no value, and... might as well be stricken from
the Constitution.
29
This protective view of privacy in the home (including a hotel room) is further
reflected in the 1948 decision of Johnson v. United States,30 a case that is particularly
germane to this discussion. In Johnson, Seattle police received a tip from an informant
that "unknown persons were smoking opium in the Europe Hotel.",31 Lieutenant
Belland and four federal narcotics agents went into the hallway of the hotel and
smelled the distinctive odor of burning opium emanating from Room One.32 Belland
knocked at the door and replied that it was "Lieutenant Belland" at the door after a
voice asked who was there. 33 The defendant opened the door, and Belland said, "I want
to talk to you a little bit."'34 She "stepped back acquiescently" and admitted them. 35 The
officer then told the defendant that she was under arrest, and the police searched the
room, finding opium and smoking apparatus.36
The lower courts upheld the admission of the evidence, 37 but the Supreme Court
reversed. 38 First, the Court found that the defendant's consent to search the room, as
suggested by her opening the door and stepping back "acquiescently," was invalid
because the "[e]ntry to [the] defendant's living quarters, which was the beginning of
the search, was demanded under color of office. It was granted in submission to
authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional
right.,
39
The Court, per Justice Jackson, conceded that a magistrate would have likely found
that the police had probable cause to search the room, 40 but found that a magistrate
should have made this determination, not the officers. In a famous passage, Justice
Jackson declared:
27. 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
28. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
29. 232 U.S. at 393.
30. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
31. Id. at 12.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 17.
39. Id. at 13.
40. Id. Thus giving rise to "plain smell" as the basis for probable cause.
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The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's
disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in
making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and
leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.'
The Court further rejected the government's argument that "exigent circumstances"
justified the warrantless search, observing that "[n]o reason is offered for not obtaining
a search warrant except the inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay
necessary to prepare papers and present the evidence to a magistrate. ' ' 42 Lastly, the
Court rejected the government's argument that the warrantless search was a valid
search incident to arrest, noting that prior to the defendant opening the door, the police
lacked probable cause to believe that the defendant, and not another occupant of the
room, was violating the law.43 Only when the police illegally discovered that Johnson
was the sole occupant did they have probable cause to arrest her.44
Thus, Johnson stands for two propositions. First, consent to search a home cannot
be valid if it is granted in "submission to authority rather than as an understanding and
intentional waiver of a constitutional right," even if police make no threats or
demands. 45 Second, police cannot get people to open their doors without a warrant and
then use evidence obtained as a result of that opening as the basis for a valid search or
arrest. 46 Thus, the Court, in effect, disapproved of a number of aspects of the "knock
and talk" technique decades before the term came into general use.
As noted, the Supreme Court has not addressed the scope of the "knock and talk"
doctrine in the years since it was rejected in Johnson. However, the lower courts have
41. Id. at 13-14 (footnote omitted). While the Court in Johnson was clearly talking about
the need for a search warrant in order to protect the home, this passage was quoted at length in
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 n.24 (1980), in which the Court held that arrest warrants
are required in order to make an arrest in the home. Since an arrest warrant, which does not
authorize a full search of the home and allows only a limited search if the suspect comes to the
door, is a lesser intrusion into the home than a search warrant, the reasoning of Johnson would
apply equally to arrests effected without warrants.
42. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 15.
43. See id. at 16.
44. Id. This view of probable cause to arrest was essentially rejected by Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), which held that police had probable cause to arrest all three
occupants of a car under a "common enterprise" theory when cocaine was found in the back-seat
armrest of the car and was accessible by all of the passengers. Id. at 372-73. The same could be
said of any and all occupants of Johnson's room (though it is not clear how Pringle would apply
to all the occupants of a house). I would concede that Johnson's view of probable cause to arrest
is unduly narrow, but the arrest in that case was nevertheless invalid because of the lack of
meaningful consent or exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry into the room.
45. See Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13. But see infra text accompanying notes 108-09 (discussing
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)).
46. See Johnson, 333 U.S. at 16-17.
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largely ignored the dictates of Johnson in granting broad approval to "knock and talk"
tactics employed by police.
II. "KNOCK AND TALK"
The phrase "knock and talk" has been used in hundreds of cases4 7 to approve the
police practice of going up to someone's door, knocking on it, and then asking the
occupant questions, obtaining a "plain view" or smell of the interior, walking around
the outside of the house, looking in windows, seeking consent to search, or arresting
the occupant. Approval of this sort of police activity is based on the notion that police
are merely doing what anyone else could do when they knock on someone's door and,
as such, are not breaching the occupant's expectations of privacy.48 Only when police
have employed "overbearing tactics," such as "'drawn weapons, raised voices, or
coercive demands,"' have their actions been faulted.49
In my view, this blanket approval of the use of "knock and talk" for a variety of
purposes is incorrect. Rather, it should depend upon the nature of the inquiry. It is
certainly appropriate for police to canvass a neighborhood following a crime to
ascertain whether anyone has knowledge about the crime. It is similarly appropriate for
police acting in their protective capacity to knock on doors in response to noise
complaints, reports of fighting or violence, and so forth. And should police observe
evidence in "plain view" during such encounters, it is proper for them to seize it.50
But the phrase "knock and talk" in police jargon generally does not refer to such
unexceptionable encounters. Rather, it is a technique employed with calculation to the
homes of people suspected of crimes. Police use "knock and talk" to gain access to a
home without a search warrant by getting the occupant to consent to entry and search,
to arrest without a warrant, to gather further evidence of a suspected crime, or to dispel
such suspicion. As one court stated, "[k]nock and talk might more aptly be named
47. See Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Rule Permitting
Knock and Talk Visits Under Fourth Amendment and State Constitutions, 15 A.L.R. 6th 515
(2006). This annotation only includes cases in which the phrase "knock and talk" is used,
though there are undoubtedly many cases that discuss what would appear to be a "knock and
talk" without describing it as such. Davis v. United States is often cited as the origin of the
doctrine, though it does not explicitly use the phrase "knock and talk." 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th
Cir. 1964) (explaining that anyone, "openly and peaceably, at high noon,... may walk up the
steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking
questions of the occupant thereof').
48. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3(c), at 575 (4th ed. 2004) ("[If
police utilize 'normal means of access to and egress from the house' for some legitimate
purpose, such as to make inquiries of the occupant,... it is not a Fourth Amendment search for
the police to see or hear or smell from that vantage point what is happening inside the
dwelling.") (citations omitted).
49. United States v. Thomas, 430 F.3d 274, 277-78 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Nash v.
United States, 117 F. App'x 992, 993 (2004) (per curiam), vacated, 544 U.S. 995 (2005)).
50. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), is an example of such a case. In Stuart,
the Court upheld a warrantless entry by police when they entered a home to break up a fight
after their knock was ignored. See id.; see also Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279,288-90 (4th
Cir. 2001) (noting that "knock and talk" for the purpose of investigating noise complaints is
generally approved).
1104 [Vol. 84:1099
"KNOCK AND TALK"AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
'knock and enter,' because [that] is usually the officer's goal .. .."51 This Article
considers each type of case separately, though frequently, of course, police have more
than one motive and often end up achieving more than one of the possible objectives of
"knock and talk."
A. "Knock and Talk"for Investigative Purposes
What might seem to be the most reasonable application of "knock and talk" doctrine
is when police suspect criminal activity at a given residence and then go to the
residence-without probable cause to arrest or search-to further investigate, to
develop probable cause, or perhaps to dispel their suspicion.
52
A typical case is United States v. Thomas.53 In that case, police strongly suspected
Thomas of stealing anhydrous ammonia, a chemical used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine5 4 Five officers went to the home where Thomas was staying to
question him. Upon arrival, police deployed to the front and rear entrances of the
house.55 The officers saw a handgun and a silver canister that was similar to canisters
that were used in other thefts of anhydrous ammonia in Thomas's truck, which was
parked behind the house.56 Two officers knocked on the back door to the residence,
which was the entrance used by the residents, but not necessarily by the public.57 When
Thomas came to the door, they asked him to come out of the residence. Thomas
complied, was immediately arrested, and was searched incident to the arrest. The
search revealed "methamphetamine and a handwritten recipe for making more. ' 8
Police also searched the truck and found more evidence.
59
The district court suppressed the evidence on the ground that the police behavior
constituted a "constructive entry" into the house without a warrant.
60
The Sixth Circuit reversed. It noted that
51. Hayes v. State, 794 N.E.2d 492, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The court further declared
that "the knock and talk procedure 'pushes the envelope' and can easily be misused." Id.
52. In all of the reported cases, police used "knock and talk" to lead to an arrest. Cases in
which the use of "knock and talk" causes suspicion to be dispelled or police to walk away
empty-handed while remaining suspicious, however, are not reported. There is the possibility of
a civil suit if police do more than just "knock and talk." See, e.g., Rogers, 249 F.3d at 287
(disapproving of a search of the curtilage for underage drinkers following a noise complaint).
53. 430 F.3d 274 (6th Cir. 2005).
54. See id. at 275-76.
55. See id. at 276.
56. Id. Whether police had a right to look in a truck parked within the curtilage is not
discussed in this case. According to the case, both the gun and the canister were visible through
the open door of the truck. Id. Also not discussed, but presumed in the case, is that police had
probable cause to arrest Thomas after looking in the truck, if not before.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Id. The district court apparently did not consider the propriety of the police trespass into
the backyard of the house where the plain view into the truck was obtained. See also infra Part
II.C (discussing issue of "constructive entry").
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the law has long permitted officers to engage in consensual encounters with
suspects without violating the Fourth Amendment....
Consensual encounters do not lose their propriety, moreover, merely because they
take place at the entrance of a citizen's home. A number of courts, including this
one, have recognized "knock and talk" consensual encounters as a legitimate
investigative technique at the home of a suspect or an individual with information
about an investigation.
6 1
The appropriateness of this sort of police behavior depends upon the homeowner's
"expectation of privacy.',62 As one court put it:
In the course of urban life, we have come to expect various members of the public
to enter upon [driveways, front porches, and so on,] e.g., brush salesmen,
newspaper boys, postmen, Girl Scout cookie sellers, distressed motorists,
neighbors, friends. Any one of them may be reasonably expected to report
observations of criminal activity to the police. If one has a reasonable expectation
that various members of society may enter the property in their personal or
business pursuits, he should find it equally likely that the police will do so.
63
This is certainly true. But there is a limit to what we may reasonably expect these
people to do. We do not expect them, having knocked on the door, to demand that we
come out or to interrogate us about suspected crimes. We do not expect them to peer
into the house in an exploratory manner when we open the door, or to go around to the
back and look in the windows or in vehicles parked there if we fail to answer the
door.64 Yet this is exactly what the courts have permitted.
In United States v. Daoust,65 police went to Daoust's home because they believed
he might have "useful information" about drug sales. Police approached his house and
knocked on the front cellar door because the front door was "inaccessible. 66 When
they received no answer, the police proceeded to the back of the house, looked through
the kitchen window, and saw a gun.67 The First Circuit held that "if [the front doors
are] inaccessible[,] there is nothing unlawful or unreasonable about going to the back
of the house to look for another door, all as part of a legitimate attempt to interview a
person.,
68
61. Thomas, 430 F.3d at 277.
62. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
63. State v. Corbett, 516 P.2d 487, 490 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (citation omitted); see also 1
LAFAVE, supra note 48, § 2.3(f), at 599 (quoting Corbett for the general principle that police
may only go where visitors may go).
64. This is not to say that such people would never do such a thing, but it is certainly not
reasonably expected that they would.
65. 916 F.2d 757 (lst Cir. 1990).
66. Id at 758.
67. Id. They then got a search warrant based on the viewing of the gun and the fact that
Daoust was a convicted felon. Id. at 757.
68. Id. at 758; accord United States v. Anderson, 552 F.2d 1296, 1300 (8th Cir. 1977)
(finding that evidence found by agents who went to the back of a home and saw contraband
through a basement window while attempting to question suspect was admissible). Estate of
Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2003), and Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279 (4th
1106 [Vol. 84:1099
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In United States v. Hammett,69 the Ninth Circuit found it appropriate for police to
"walk[] [completely] around the house" in order to ensure officer safety and to
"attempt to locate someone with whom they could speak., 70 In United States v.
Wheeler, the court approved of the police standing on tires to look over the fence into
the back yard to see if anyone was there to question.71
In Young v. City ofRadclff,72 the police went to question Young about shoplifting.
While two police officers knocked on the front door, two others went around to the
back. While standing in the curtilage and looking in the back door, they could see that
Young had a gun. 3 After hearing a commotion, Young went to the back door. Due to a
hearing impairment, however, he failed to respond to their command to drop the gun,
and they shot him.74 While the court found that the police's trespass on the curtilage
violated the Fourth Amendment, it upheld qualified immunity for the police in the case
because it was "not unreasonable" for the police to believe they were outside the
curtilage.75
In none of the aforementioned cases were the police acting like members of the
public approaching one's house. Rather, they were aggressively pursuing investigations
and intruding on the homeowner's property in a manner that violated his reasonable
expectation of privacy.76 Girl Scouts, postmen, and brush salesmen don't do this sort of
thing.77 They simply knock on one's front door and, if nobody answers, they go away.
If, however, such people become too intrusive, homeowners can always call the police!
The courts have taken the unexceptionable behavior that ordinary citizens might
engage in and turned it into a right of police to question people at their home, which in
turn gives them the authority to trespass on private areas of the curtilage, look around,
and peer in the windows. What protection does the curtilage afford if it is not to guard
against just this sort of thing? "Knock and talk" has become a "talisman in whose
presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.,
78
Not only are these decisions inconsistent with the decision in Johnson, they also run
counter to the Supreme Court's decision in Bond v. United States.79 Bond was riding
Cir. 2001), generally agree with these cases while expressing concern that the police behavior in
the cases before them may have gone too far.
69. 236 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2001).
70. Id. at 1060.
71. 641 F.2d 1321, 1327 (9th Cir. 1981).
72. 561 F. Supp. 2d 767 (W.D. Ky. 2008).
73. Id. at 777.
74. Id. at 778.
75. Id. But see Daughenbaugh v. City of Tiffin, 150 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that
going to the back door for a "knock and talk" about stolen goods, after there was no answer at
the front door, was a trespass on the curtilage, and when the police obtained a plain view of
stolen goods in the separate garage, it was invalid).
76. The definition of "reasonable expectation of privacy" is a subject of considerable
uncertainty. See Orin Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV.
503, 505 (2007). I think, however, that most will agree that the police behavior cited in these
cases was a violation of a person's "reasonable expectation of privacy."
77. As noted earlier, they could, but one doesn't reasonably expect them to.
78. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,461-62 (1971) (plurality opinion).
79. 529 U.S. 334 (2000). Interestingly, this seven-to-two decision written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, represented one of the few times in his thirty-year career on the Court where he
voted, much less wrote an opinion, for a defendant in a nonunanimous Fourth Amendment case.
2009] 1107
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
on a bus. A Border Patrol agent came on the bus to check the immigration status of the
passengers. Then he went back through the bus, squeezing the soft luggage that
passengers had placed in the overhead storage space above the seats. When the agent
squeezed the defendant's bag he felt a "'brick-like' object," which turned out to be a
"brick" of methamphetamine.80
The government argued, in a fashion similar to the "knock and talk" cases, that "by
exposing his bag to the public, petitioner lost a reasonable expectation that his bag
would not be physically manipulated.",81 But the Court rejected the government's
argument, accepting instead the petitioner's argument that the agent's "physical
manipulation of [the defendant's] luggage 'far exceeded the casual contact [petitioner]
could have expected from other passengers." 82 The Court reasoned that while "a bus
passenger clearly expects that his bag may be handled, he does not expect that other
passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory
manner."
8 3
Similarly, while one expects that members of the public may come to his front door,
he certainly does not expect that, if there is no answer to their knock, they will continue
to examine his house and curtilage "in an exploratory manner."' 4 Likewise, one does
not expect that they will ask or demand that he come out. 5 Similarly, just because
neighbors can see into your backyard does not mean that the police are entitled to do so
by trespassing on your curtilage
8 6
Another type of investigative "knock and talk" occurs when the suspect does come
to the door and the police do talk to him. The courts agree that this is permissible so
long as the police behavior is not so coercive as to turn this into a "custodial
interrogation. s"87 Clearly the police behavior falls under the definition of
"interrogation,"88 and therefore, in most cases the only issue is whether the
interrogation is "custodial." This form of investigative "knock and talk" more closely
resembles the type of behavior that members of the general public, including religious
proselytizers, salesmen, and politicians, might exhibit. But, these people do not come
to interrogate the homeowner about criminal activity, especially in the middle of the
See also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (holding, eight-to-one with Rehnquist
writing for the majority, that issues of probable cause and reasonable suspicion should be
reviewed de novo by the court of appeals-a result that happened to favor the defendant).
80. Bond, 529 U.S. at 336. Justice Breyer, who wrote the Daoust opinion for the First
Circuit, authored the dissent in Bond. See id. at 339 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 337 (majority opinion).
82. Id. at 338 (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 338-39. Bond distinguished other cases where a visual inspection had been
allowed on the ground that they involve "only visual, as opposed to tactile, observation.
Physically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection." Id. at 337
(pointing to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968)). The cases discussed herein involve
physical trespass on suspects' curtilage, not mere visual inspection from the street.
84. Bond, 529 U.S. at 339.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Titemore, 335 F. Supp. 502 (D. Vt. 2004) (holding that an
officer's request for the suspect to come outside was proper).
86. They could, however, get the neighbors to let them into their yard for a view.
87. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Zertuche-Tobias, 953 F. Supp. 803 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
88. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (suggesting that interrogation
includes "any words or actions on the part of the police.., that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect").
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night.s9 In addition, if a homeowner tells members of the general public to leave, they
usually leave. In fact, the police's physical presence is designed to put pressure on the
suspect, as well as to allow the police to check for any physical evidence they may see.
This is the reason why the police do not simply call on the phone. The police could
also question people on the street. The notion that "a man's home is his castle" would
seem to encompass the principle that police cannot come there to interrogate the
occupant without legal authorization-like an arrest or search warrant.
1. Exigent Circumstances
Once "knock and talk" is allowed, the exigent circumstances issue arises. What
happens if the door is opened and the police see either evidence of criminal activity or
a person whom they have probable cause to arrest? 90 Are the police entitled to rush in
and seize the evidence or the person? On this there is confusion. In United States v.
Scroger,91 the police went to Scroger's residence to investigate reports of drug activity.
When the defendant answered the door, it became obvious that he was engaged in the
manufacture of methamphetamine. 92 The Tenth Circuit agreed that an exigent
circumstance entry to arrest was appropriate, noting that the police did not feel that
they had enough evidence to constitute probable cause prior to the "knock and talk.,
9 3
No "emergency" other than the need to arrest the suspect was discussed. This is exactly
the sort of behavior the Supreme Court disapproved of in Johnson.
Likewise, in United States v. Charles,94 the Third Circuit approved an exigent
circumstances entry where the police, investigating a marijuana growing complaint,
knocked on the door and smelled marijuana when the suspect opened the door. When
the suspect denied them consent to enter and ran back into the house, locking the door
behind her, the police broke down the door, obtained a "plain view" of the marijuana,
and put this information in a search warrant.95
89. See, e.g., United States v. Ponce Munoz, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1133 (D. Kan. 2001)
(midnight); Richards v. Commonwealth, No. 2003-CA-001922-MR, 2004 WL 1367480, at *1
(Ky. Ct. App. June 18, 2004) (2 a.m.); People v. Sweet, No. 239511,2003 WL 22138030, at *3
(Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2003) (3 a.m.). In each of these cases, the courts approved the late
night "knock and talks." But see United States v. Reyes-Montes, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1327-
28 (D. Kan. 2002) (disapproving of a I a.m. "knock and talk" where four armed officers had to
knock repeatedly to rouse the defendants out of bed).
90. See infra Part II.C. (discussing exigent circumstances).
91. 98 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 1996).
92. Id. at 1259.
93. See id. at 1259-60; accord United States v. Milikan, 404 F. Supp. 2d 924, 927-29
(E.D. Tex. 2005) (approving entry on exigent circumstances grounds when police went to a
hotel room to investigate weapons violations and spotted a gun case near an occupant of the
room when another answered the door).
94. 29 F. App'x 892 (3d Cir. 2002).
95. See id. at 894. The Second Circuit also approves exigent circumstance entries following
"knock and talk." See United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990). But see United
States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that the police cannot deliberately
create exigent circumstances through "knock and talk").
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In United States v. Jones,96 the Fifth Circuit was more leery of the police claim of
exigent circumstances, but ultimately accepted the claim. In Jones, the police went to
an apartment house to investigate possible drug activity. When the police arrived at
Jones' apartment, the screen door was shut. As the defendant answered the door, the
police, peering through the screen, noticed a gun on the kitchen table.97 Since another
resident was still inside the apartment, the police entered and seized the firearm. The
police ascertained that Jones was a felon and arrested him for possession of a gun.
98
The court adhered to the rule of the circuit that police may not create their own exigent
circumstances.99 The court, however, claimed that Jones created the exigent
circumstance by leaving a gun where it could be seen through the screen door, even
though the door could only be reached by entering the apartment building.' 00
In United States v. Chambers,I0' the Sixth Circuit was more restrictive. In
Chambers, the police went to the defendant's home with "overwhelming" evidence that
the defendant was operating a methamphetamine lab, and knocked on the door.'0 2 The
woman who answered the door retreated and called out that there were police at the
door. 0 3 Fearing that evidence would be destroyed, the police burst through the door.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's suppression of the evidence, rejecting the
exigent circumstance claim.'4 Furthermore, the court held that an exigent circumstance
entry must be in response to an "unanticipated emergency," which means that the
police cannot simply create the exigency for themselves. 105 While this appears to be in
clear conflict with the Tenth and Third Circuits, a careful reading of Chambers
suggests that the Sixth Circuit's "rule" is limited to situations where the police
determined in advance that they were going to search and thus "deliberately" sought to
"evade the warrant requirement."' 1 6 The Sixth Circuit did not take the position that no
exigency arising from a "knock and talk" could give rise to a legally sanctioned entry
and seizure of persons or evidence. 0 7 A proposed solution to the exigent circumstance
problem will be discussed in the last section of this Article.
96. 239 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 2001).
97. Seeid. at719.
98. See id
99. See id. at 720.
100. See id. at 720-21. The Fifth Circuit's commitment to the rule that police may not create
exigent circumstances through a "knock and talk" is further undercut by United States v.
Anderson, 160 F. App'x 391 (5th Cir. 2005), which approved a warrantless entry to seize
narcotics and a gun that were seen when the suspect opened the door in response to a police
knock.
101. 395 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2005).
102. Id. at 567.
103. See id. at 568.
104. See id. at 569.
105. Id. at 565.
106. Id. at 569.
107. See Bryan Abramoske, Note, It Doesn't Matter What They Intended: The Need for
Objective Permissibility Review of Police-Created Exigencies in "Knock and Talk"
Investigations, 41 SuFFOLK U. L. REv. 561, 573-76 (2008) (discussing the approach of various
circuits).
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B. "Knock and Talk"for the Purpose of Getting a Consent to Search
The police perform "knock and talks" for the purpose of getting consent to search,
both when they do have probable cause and when they do not. In the first case, it saves
them the trouble of getting a warrant, and in the second, it saves them both the trouble
of getting a warrant and articulating probable cause-so much for the "special
protection" of the home. It is not surprising that the lower courts have approved this
behavior, however, because it is directly encouraged by the 1973 auto search case of
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte:
10 8
In situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack
probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid consent may be
the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence.... And in those
cases where there is probable cause to arrest or search, but where the police lack a
warrant, a consent search may still be valuable. If the search is conducted and
proves fruitless, that in itself may convince the police that arrest with its possible
stigma and embarrassment is unnecessary, or that a far more extensive search
pursuant to a warrant is not justified. In short, a search pursuant to consent may
result in considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the search ....10
Thus, to hear the Court tell it, consent searches are a great thing for police and
citizens alike. The Court expanded this idea further in United States v. Drayton,"1
0
suggesting that waiving one's rights and consenting to search was practically a civic
duty:
In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and consent should be given a
weight and dignity of its own. Police officers act in full accord with the law when
they ask citizens for consent. It reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise
the police of his or her wishes and for the police to act in reliance on that
understanding. When this exchange takes place it dispels inferences of
coercion.
As I have previously observed, this is nonsense.'2 As Professor Marcy Strauss puts
it:
Every year I witness the same mass incredulity. Why, 100 criminal procedure
students jointly wonder, would someone "voluntarily" consent to allow police
officers to search the trunk of his car, knowing that massive amounts of cocaine
are easily visible there? The answer, I've come to believe, is that most people
don't willingly consent to police searches. Yet absent extraordinary circumstances,
108. 412 U.S. 218 (1972).
109. Id. at 227-28 (footnotes omitted).
110. 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
111. Id. at207.
112. See CRAIG BRADLEY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: RECENT CASES ANALYZED 75 (2007)
(suggesting that "[c]onsent searches are the black hole into which Fourth Amendment rights are
swallowed up and disappear").
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chances are that a court nonetheless will conclude that the consent was valid and
the evidence admissible under the Fourth Amendment.
113
Professor Tracey Maclin points out that police consider consent searches extremely
easy to get, and one detective estimated that as many as ninety-eight percent of
searches are by consent. " 4 Even if police are initially refused consent, they can often
cajole the homeowner into giving it. 15
The only limitation imposed by the Court on consent searches is that the consent
must be "voluntary."' 16 The Court in Schneckloth, however, held that the concept of
voluntariness did not include either a warning or a showing that the suspect knew that
he had a right to refuse," 17 thus seeming to back away from the "understanding and
intentional waiver" standard of Johnson. 118
Schneckloth and Drayton should be distinguished from the typical "knock and talk"
scenario on the grounds that neither of those cases involved consent to search a
home,' 19 and that the standard should be higher given the Supreme Court's often-stated
special regard for the privacy of the home.1 20 In fact, the search location appears to be
the only meaningful distinction between Johnson and Schneckloth. Johnson is
repeatedly cited with approval in Schneckloth121 as an example of an invalid consent
search where the prosecutor failed to meet his "burden ofproving that the consent was
... freely and voluntarily given."'
' 22
But what was the difference in the consents in Schneckloth and Johnson? In neither
case were guns displayed nor threatening language used. In neither case did the suspect
demur in any way when asked for consent. 23 And in neither case was the suspect
warned of any right to refuse. The main difference seems to be that, whereas in
113. Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRNI. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 211-12
(2002). Strauss then proposes abolishing consent searches altogether. See id. at 252-56.
114. Tracey Maclin, The Good and Bad News about Consent Searches in the Supreme
Court, 39 McGEORGE L. REv. 27, 31 n. 16 (2008) (quoting RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, L. PAUL
SUTTON & CHARLOTrE A. CARTER, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE SEARCH WARRANT
PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 69 (1984)).
115. See id. at 82. Maclin proposes at least disallowing this sort of cajoling.
116. E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1973).
117. Seeid. at234.
118. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
119. Schneckloth, however, made it clear in dictum that its reasoning applied to homes. See
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232 ("Consent searches ... normally occur on the highway, or in a
person's home or office .... ").
120. The court placed a modest limit on home (and presumably other) consent searches in
Georgia v. Randolph. 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (holding that the consent of one occupant of a home
is invalid if the other occupant is present and withholds consent). It is unclear how this would
apply to consent to the search of a car.
121. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222, 233, 234, 243 n.31.
122. Id. at 222.
123. See id. at 220. However, the Court describes the behavior in Schneckloth as "ask(ing),"
id., and in Johnson as "demanded under color of office," id. at 243 n.31 (quoting Johnson, 333
U.S. at 13). In Johnson, however, all the police did was state their identity prior to the suspect
opening her door, and say "I want to talk to you" prior to her "stepp[ing] back acquiescently."
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 12.
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Schneckloth the suspect was asked to consent to search his car, in Johnson the police
had asked the suspect to open the door of her dwelling.
The lower courts have generally approved the practice of avoiding warrant and/or
probable cause requirements through "knock and talk" consents. The 2007 case of
United States v. Crapser,124 from the Ninth Circuit, is typical of the general deference
given to these consents.125 In Crapser, the police, after receiving information that the
suspect may have been involved in the cooking of methamphetamine and also may
have had an arrest warrant outstanding (though it turned out he did not), decided to go
to the motel where he was staying to "knock and talk [their] way into obtaining consent
to search the room."
126
Four officers, of whom three were visibly armed and in uniform, knocked on the
door of the motel room. When a woman pulled back the curtains and viewed them, one
of the officers asked her to open the door so he could speak with her. After two
minutes she did, and she and the defendant stepped outside and closed the door behind
them. 27 The police moved them into two groups, with two cops and one suspect per
group. The groups were spaced ten to twenty-five feet from each other on the sidewalk
to the parking area. According to the court, "[d]uring this initial part of the contact, the
officers did not block or physically keep Defendant or [the woman] from walking away
or returning to their room, nor did the officers affirmatively assert authority over the
movements of [the suspects]."' 28 After about five minutes of questioning, the defendant
voluntarily produced a syringe from his pocket and said, "This is all I have on me.' 29
Shortly thereafter, both the defendant and the woman consented to a search of the
room. Drugs and drug paraphernalia were found on the defendant and a gun was found
in the room.
30
In a two-to-one decision, the Ninth Circuit upheld the search, finding that the initial
contact with the defendant, as well as the consent to search, was voluntary. The court
noted that there was a "single polite knock on the door," and that the officers "made no
effort to draw attention to their weapons, nor did they use any form of physical
force."'131 Furthermore,
[t]he encounter occurred in the middle of the day, on a sidewalk in public view.
The entire event, up to the time Defendant produced the syringe, lasted about five
minutes.... The police did not block Defendant or [the woman], suggest that they
could not leave or return to their room, give them orders, or affirmatively assert
authority over their movements. 
132
124. 472 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2007).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Larson, 63 F. App'x 416 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Charles, 29 F. App'x 892 (3d Cir. 2002).
126. See Crapser, 472 F.3d at 1143.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 1144.
129. Id.
130. Seeid. at 1145.
131. Id. at 1146.
132. Id.
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Moreover, the court concluded that "[e]ven if the initial encounter was a seizure, it
was a Terry stop supported by reasonable suspicion, ' ' 133 justified because the suspect
"voluntarily" exited the motel room. 134
In dissent, Judge Reinhardt declared that "the majority opinion further weakens our
Fourth Amendment protections-whatever is left of them." 135 He noted that the test as
to the voluntariness of consent, according to Florida v. Bostick,"36 is whether a
reasonable person approached by police would have believed that he was "not at
liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business."' 137 In Orhorhaghe v.
INS,138 the Ninth Circuit further elaborated on Bostick by considering five factors:
(1) the number of officers involved; (2) whether the officers' weapons were
displayed; (3) whether the encounter occurred in a public or non-public setting; (4)
whether the officers' officious or authoritative manner would imply that
compliance would be compelled; and (5) whether the officers advised the detainee
of his right to terminate the encounter.'
39
Considering all of this, Judge Reinhardt concluded that the defendant was not "at
liberty to ignore the police presence and to go about his business."' 14 Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine a situation in which one would feel free to ignore the presence of
police banging on his door and "go about his business." As the Second Circuit put it, in
finding no consent where the suspect opened the door in response to a knock from
three armed agents:
[t]o hold otherwise would be to present occupants with an unfair dilemma, to say
the least---either open the door and thereby forfeit cherished privacy interests or
refuse to open the door and thereby run the risk of creating the appearance of an
"exigency" sufficient to justify a forcible entry.141
133. Id. at 1147.
134. Id at 1149.
135. Id. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
136. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
137. Id. at 437 (quoting Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988)). The Court,
while treating these as equivalent formulations, also stated the test another way in Bostick:
"whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise
terminate the encounter." Id. at 436.
138. 38 F.3d488 (9thCir. 1994).
139. Crapser, 472 F.3d at 1150 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Washington, 387 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004)) (describing the Orhorhaghe factors). The
majority quoted United States v. Jones, 286 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002), which described
the five factors significantly differently. See id. at 1149 (majority opinion). Orhorhaghe contains
a more extensive discussion that could be summarized in various ways. Presumably, the
summary from Washington represents the law of the circuit.
140. Crapser, 472 F.3d at 1153 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (quoting Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at
494).
141. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 n.9 (2d Cir. 1978). But see United States v.
Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that by opening the door to a delivery person's
knock, the suspect sacrificed his expectations of privacy and could be ordered out of the
apartment and arrested without a warrant).
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Some courts have approved even more aggressive police tactics in obtaining
"consent." In United States v. Dickerson, 142 four police officers with guns drawn
knocked on the defendant's door. After repeated knocking, the naked defendant came
to the door and opened it about one foot.143 One police officer stuck his foot in the
opening and requested entry. The defendant responded by saying he needed to get
dressed, whereupon the police asked if they could come in while he did. Upon their
request, the defendant admitted them.'" The Seventh Circuit found defendant's
consent to be voluntary.
145
Moreover, once consent is obtained, courts approve the use of a "protective sweep"
to allow police to go into areas not authorized by the consent. For example, in United
States v. Gould,14 the police went to the defendant's trailer. His roommate admitted
them and told them that the defendant was asleep in the master bedroom. While the
court held that the police lacked real or apparent consent to enter the master
bedroom, 147 it upheld the entry of the bedroom on the ground that this was a
"protective sweep" authorized by Maryland v. Buie,148 even though Buie was limited to
searches incident to arrest. 1
49
Some courts have disallowed such aggressive behavior as used in Crapser and
Dickerson. For example, in United States v. Jerez,Is0 a different panel of the Seventh
Circuit struck down a consent search when the police had knocked on a hotel room
door and window for three minutes in the middle of the night and called out, "Police.
Open up the door. We'd like to talk to you.''5 The court held that the occupant was
"seized," under Terry v. Ohio, 5 2 when he complied with this request 1 3 and that the
seizure was illegal because it was not based on reasonable suspicion.' 54 He could not
"reasonably have believed that he was ... free to disregard the police presence and go
142. 975 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1992).
143. Id. at 1247.
144. See id.; see also Nash v. United States, 117 F. App'x 992, 993 (6th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (holding that the defendant's being handcuffed and surrounded by police did not
invalidate consent to search, noting that "no testimony... indicates drawn weapons, raised
voices or coercive demands on the part of the police"), vacated, 544 U.S. 995 (2005).
145. See Dickerson, 975 F.2d at 1249. To be fair, the court recognized that on their face, the
facts of this case seemed to require that the police behavior be struck down. The court noted,
however, that the police were investigating a very recent bank robbery, had strong evidence that
the suspect was the perpetrator, and believed that his nakedness was an attempt to establish an "I
was in bed with my girlfriend" alibi. Id.
146. 364 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
147. See id at 589.
148. 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
149. Id. at 327; Gould, 364 F.3d at 581. The police did have a reasonable suspicion of
danger in Gould. Gould, 364 F.3d at 591.
150. 108 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 1997).
151. Id, at687.
152. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
153. Jerez, 108 F.3d at 690.
154. See id. at 693.
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about his business."' 155 While I agree with the outcome of this case, I reject the court's
suggestion that the police conduct would have been allowed if they had had reasonable
suspicion, 156 as discussed below. In dissent, Judge Coffey vigorously argued that the
police behavior was acceptable and also based on reasonable suspicion.'
57
Johnson should be recalled at this point. All that the policeman did there was knock
on the door, reply "Lieutenant Belland" when asked who was there, and then express a
desire to talk to her when Johnson opened the door. 158 Her acquiescence in the police's
entry was held to be in "submission to authority" and therefore not a valid consent.
159
The requirement of aggressive police behavior by the courts of appeal before consents
will be invalidated, while arguably true to Schneckloth, is inconsistent with Johnson
and Bostick, as well as with any notion that "a man's home is his castle." Whatever
may be said of consents to search luggage and cars, consents to search homes, offices,
and hotel rooms should be more tightly regulated.
A number of courts have suggested, as did Jerez, that reasonable suspicion may be
the key to these cases: if the police have reasonable suspicion, they can "seize" the
defendant and then obtain a valid consent to search. 160 The Ninth Circuit, however, has
rejected this suggestion:
Terry's twin rationales for a brief investigatory detention-the evasive nature of
the activities police observe on the street and the limited nature of the intrusion-
appear to be inapplicable to an encounter at a suspect's home. Officers on the beat
may lose a suspect before the officers have gathered enough information to have
probable cause for an arrest. In contrast, officers who know where a suspect lives
have the opportunity to investigate until they develop probable cause, all the while
knowing where to find the suspect. Because "[n]owhere is the protective force of
the fourth amendment more powerful than [within] the sanctity of the home," the
second rationale for a Terry-stop seems almost absent by definition when the
intrusion is at a suspect's home.
155. Id. at 689 (quoting Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567, 576 (1988)); cf United
States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant's consent was no
good after police had already broken in illegally and arrested him).
156. Professor Stuntz has pointed out that "the real standard applied in [consent] cases... is
not the 'reasonable person' test that courts cite but rather a kind of Jeopardy rule: if the officer
puts his command in the form of a question, consent is deemed voluntary and the evidence
comes in." William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH.
L. REv. 1016, 1064 (1995). Similarly, Professor Weinreb has written that "[t]he product of
Schneckloth is likely to be still another series of fourth amendment cases in which the courts
provide a lengthy factual description followed by a conclusion (most likely, in the current
climate, that consent was voluntarily given), without anything to connect the two." Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Cm. L. REv. 47, 57 (1974). This has
proved to be prescient.
157. See Jerez, 108 F.3d at 696-721 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
158. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 12 (1948); supra notes 30-35 and
accompanying text.
159. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13; supra note 39 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., United States v. Crapser, 472 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 2001).
161. United States v. Washington, 387 F.3d 1060, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal
citations omitted) (alterations in original). Crapser distinguished Washington on the ground
1116 [Vol. 84:1099
"KNOCK AND TALK "AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Moreover, the fact that police had reasonable suspicion to detain someone at his
residence would make the consent no more "voluntary" than if they lacked it, and if
they grabbed or frisked him prior to seeking consent, it would seem to make any such
consent considerably less voluntary.
Other courts have suggested, though not held, that approaches to houses for the
purpose of obtaining consent, or for "knock and talk" in general, may only be justified
in the first place if the police have reasonable suspicion.162 This would be a reasonable
limitation on consent searches of automobiles, where police, having stopped a car for a
traffic violation, often seek consent for no articulable reason.163 But when police go to
a house seeking consent to search, they ordinarily have a substantial suspicion before
they bother to make the trip. Consequently, any "reasonable suspicion" limitation
would not offer much further protection for the privacy of the home.
C. "Knock and Talk "for the Purpose ofArrest
Arrests in the home are governed by Payton v. New York,164 which held that in order
for the police to arrest someone in their home they must have an arrest warrant and
reason to believe the suspect is within.165 Nevertheless the police constantly use "knock
and talk" to get around this requirement. These tactics have created considerable
confusion among the lower courts as to just what police behavior is allowed. There are
conflicts in the circuits as to whether the initial knock can give rise to exigent
circumstances, which then allow the warrant requirement to be waived, as previously
discussed. 66 There are further conflicts as to whether the police standing outside and
demanding or asking that the suspect come out constitutes an arrest, and whether, if the
suspect comes to the door, the police may step or reach over the threshold in order to
arrest him.
One type of situation has been clearly resolved. In United States v. Santana 167 the
police arrived at Santana's house with probable cause that she had in her possession
marked money used to make a recent heroin "buy."' 168 As they pulled up in front of
Santana's house, they saw her standing on the threshold of the front door. As soon as
she saw them, she ran into the house. The police followed in hot pursuit and arrested
her in the vestibule. 69 The Court held that, by standing on the threshold, Santana was
"not merely visible to the public but as exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and
touch as if she had been standing completely outside her house.' '170 Consequently, her
that, in Crapser, the suspect had voluntarily exited the motel before he was "seized." See
Crapser, 472 F.3d at 1147.
162. See, e.g., Jones, 239 F.3d at 721; United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th
Cir. 1991) ("Reasonable suspicion cannot justify the warrantless search of a house, but it can
justify the agents' approaching the house to question the occupants.").
163. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
164. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
165. See id. at 589-90.
166. See supra Part II.A. I.
167. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
168. See id. at 39-40.
169. See id. at 40.
170. Id. at42.
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flight into the house created an exigent circumstance, which allowed the police to
follow in hot pursuit.'71
In the usual case, however, the suspect is not standing outside when the police
arrive, and police lack exigent circumstances to make a warrantless entry. Rather, they
seek to avoid the warrant requirement through "knock and tal"--even though they
may have probable cause-hoping that either the suspect will submit to arrest, exit the
house, or that exigent circumstances will arise. For example, in Thomas, discussed
previously, 172 five policemen, having gone to the place where Thomas lived to
investigate the theft of anhydrous ammonia, knocked on the door. When they saw
Thomas inside, they asked him to come out, and then immediately arrested him. The
District Court ruled that this was a "constructive entry" in violation of the arrest
warrant requirement of Payton. 73 But the Sixth Circuit reversed on the ground that this
was a "consensual encounter": "No testimony... indicate[d] drawn weapons, raised
voices, or coercive demands on the part of the police."'174 Where there is such a show
of force, courts are more likely to consider the opening of the door involuntary and the
arrest invalid.
75
But whether or not the police engage in extremely aggressive behavior is not the
point. Payton requires a warrant to arrest someone at his home, period. Whether the
police arrest him by standing at the door and asking, ordering, or insisting with drawn
guns that he come out is irrelevant.
Several circuits have held that if the suspect opens the door in response to a police
knock, it is not considered a Payton violation for the police to arrest him on the spot
without a warrant.' 76 The reasoning is that, once the suspect comes to the door, he is in
"plain view" as in Santana, and consequently the police have the right to seize him.
Under this reasoning, it would not seem to matter whether the suspect voluntarily
acceded to the arrest, or whether the police had to step into the vestibule to arrest him.
In United States v. Vaneaton,177 for example, the police had just obtained probable
cause that a person they were seeking to arrest was staying at a nearby motel. They
171. Id. at 42-43.
172. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
173. United States v. Thomas, 430 F.3d 274, 276 (6th Cir. 2005).
174. Id. at 278 (describing a "typical consensual encounter").
175. See, e.g., Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 819 (3d Cir. 1997) (arguing that "[n]o
reasonable person would have believed that he was free to remain in the house" when the police
surrounded the house, pointed machine guns at the windows, and ordered the occupants out);
United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1161 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding coercion where ten
officers surrounded the house, blocked the suspect's car, "flooded the house with spotlights and
summoned Morgan from his mother's house with the blaring call of a bullhom").
176. See, e.g., United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 54 (2d Cir. 2000). In Gori, however, it
was a delivery person, not the police, who knocked on the door. The police then ordered the
residents out at gunpoint. The court placed weight on the fact that it was the knock of an
"invitee" rather than police that caused the door to be opened. See also McKinnon v. Car, 103
F.3d 934 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Peters, 912 F.2d 208, 210 (8th Cir. 1990) ("When
an individual voluntarily opens the door of his or her place of residence in response to a simple
knock, the individual is knowingly exposing to the public anything that can be seen through that
open door and thus is not afforded fourth amendment protection."); United States v. Carrion,
809 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1987).
177. 49 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1995).
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immediately traveled to the motel, knocked on the door, and, when Vaneaton answered
the door, arrested him. The Ninth Circuit held that, "by opening the door as he did,
Vaneaton exposed himself in a public place,"'78 and approved the arrest as well as the
search incident thereto.
Other courts reject this approach, holding as the Seventh Circuit did, that "a person
does not surrender reasonable expectations ofprivacy in the home by simply answering
a knock at the door."'17 9 As Judge Posner explained:
Since few people will refuse to open the door to the police, the effect of the rule of
[the Second and Ninth Circuits] is to undermine, for no good reason that we can
see, the principle that a warrant is required for entry into the home, in the absence
of consent or compelling circumstances. Those cases equate knowledge (what the
officer obtains from the plain view0) with a right to enter, and by so doing permit
the rule of Payton to be evaded.
18
Thus while the Seventh Circuit rejects the notion that simply coming to the door in
response to a police knock creates both a plain view and an automatic right to enter
under an exigent circumstance theory, it does not deny the right of the police to knock
and obtain a plain view of the suspect or contraband if he or it can be seen when the
door is opened. It simply requires an additional showing of exigent circumstances
before the police can enter without a warrant,' 8 1 something that often will not be
difficult for the police to show, depending upon what "exigent circumstances" means.
Still, the Seventh Circuit's rule avoids the most blatant violation of the Payton
principle.
It would seem that the dispute among the circuits on this point should be settled in
favor of the Seventh, by New York v. Harris, 18 2 decided by the Supreme Court in 1990.
In Harris, the police, with probable cause to arrest, but no warrant, knocked on
Harris's door, "displaying their guns and badges. Harris let them enter."'8 3 There was
no dispute that this arrest was illegal, and that Harris's statement to the police
immediately following the arrest was inadmissible, despite his receipt of Miranda
178. Id. at 1427. The court seems to place some weight on the fact that Vaneaton knew,
through looking out the window, that it was the police.
179. Sparing v. Vill. of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 2001); accord McClish
v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231 (11 th Cir. 2007) (where suspect answered the door and was standing
just inside, police reaching in and grabbing him was a Payton violation); United States v.
McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 229 (4th Cir. 1990) (opening the door partway to determine who is
knocking is not a consent to entry); Duncan v. Storie, 869 F.2d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 1989); see
also Evan B. Citron, Note, Say Hello and Wave Goodbye: The Legitimacy of Plain View
Seizures at the Threshold of the Home, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2761 (2006) (thorough discussion
of this conflict); Jennifer Marino, Comment, Does Payton Apply?: Absent Consent or Exigent
Circumstance, Are Warrantless, In-Home Police Seizures andArrests ofPersons Seen Through
an Open Door of the Home Legal?, 2005 U. C. LEGAL F. 569 (further discussion of these
issues).
180. Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2004).
181. Id.
182. 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
183. Id. at 15.
2009] 1119
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
warnings. 184 It is clear that it was not the "display of guns and badges" that rendered
this arrest illegal, but rather the failure of the police to come with an arrest warrant:
Payton... drew a line at the entrance to the home. This special solicitude was
necessary because "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." The arrest warrant was required to
"interpose the magistrate's determination of probable cause" to arrest before the
officers could enter a house to effect an arrest.
185
Harris seems clear: police may not effect a valid arrest by coming to the door of a
house with probable cause and, when the suspect comes to the door, arresting him. Yet
the courts that permit this sort of thing ignore Harris, which is better known for its
holding that the illegal arrest does not invalidate subsequent statements made outside
the house after proper Miranda warnings.
It is likewise manifest from Payton's companion case, Riddick v. New York, 186 that
if someone else in the household opens the door in response to the police knock, and
the defendant is spotted through the door, the police are not entitled to enter and arrest
him without a warrant or some showing of exigent circumstances beyond the mere
desire to arrest the suspect. Why should it matter who opens the door?
Many courts that adhere to what has been termed the "sanctity of the home"
approach, disallowing this sort of police conduct,' 87 further hold that it is not necessary
for the police to cross the threshold to violate Payton: if the suspect comes to the door
in response to the police knock, and the police inform him that he is under arrest, then
this is also a violation, even if he then comes out willingly. 88
But Professor LaFave argues that this is both contrary to the language of Payton,
which holds only that the "threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a
warrant" 18 9 and also contrary to its rationale.190 LaFave points out that
the warrant requirement makes sense only in terms of the entry, rather than the
arrest; the arrest itself is no "more threatening or humiliating than a street arrest."
This certainly means that ifthe arrest can be accomplished without entry, it should
be deemed lawful notwithstanding the absence of a warrant even ifthe arrestee was
just inside rather than on the threshold at the time.191
LaFave bolsters this argument by pointing out that these cases should not be
resolved by such "metaphysical subtleties" as whether the defendant was "'in' the
184. The only dispute was whether a subsequent statement made at the police station was
admissible. The Court held that it was. See id. at 19.
185. Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
186. 445 U.S. 573, 578 (1980).
187. Citron, supra note 179, at 2762.
188. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 48, § 6.1(e), at 301 n.156 (collecting cases).
189. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
190. Cf United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1387 (7th Cir. 1991) ("If the person
recognizes and submits to [police] authority, the arrestee, in effect has forfeited the privacy of
his home to a certain extent.").
191. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 48, § 6.1 (e), at 302 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE § 307 (1975) (emphasis in original)).
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doorway rather than 'at' it, or 'on' the threshold rather than "by" it.192 Since "in the
vast majority of such confrontations the person will submit to the police," this will
relieve the police from "having to obtain arrest warrants in a large number of cases in
advance, and the warrant process is therefore not overtaxed."'
' 93
LaFave recognizes that this creates a new problem: what to do if the person, upon
seeing the police, retreats back into the residence. LaFave says that in such a case, the
police should be required to "withdraw and return another time with a warrant."'194 This
is asking for an unusual degree of restraint by police who are, under LaFave's
approach, legitimately seeking a suspect whom they have probable cause to arrest.
Most courts would likely find exigent circumstances to justify chasing down the
suspect in this situation, arguing that, unlike Riddick, he was trying to get away.
Still, if one accepts the basic propriety of police going to people's houses in hopes
of getting them to submit to warrantless arrests, despite the holding of Payton, then
LaFave's solution is reasonable. But I do not accept that. As we have seen, police,
whatever their motive in conducting the "knock and talk" originally, use it as a means
of intruding on the suspect's privacy in numerous ways. Thus in hoping to effect a
"voluntary" arrest, the police will also obtain plain views and smells from the suspect's
residence, go around the back to look for him, and perhaps be allowed to look in
outbuildings if he does not answer the door. 1
95
More importantly, if the police can arrest a suspect, either by ordering or asking her
to come to the door, or by hoping that she comes voluntarily, they will then be able to
search the entrance area from whence she came, incident to the arrest.' 96 Moreover,
they will be able to make a "protective sweep" of the room from which she emerged,
without any showing of additional suspicion, and upon a showing of reasonable
suspicion of danger, extend that sweep into other rooms of the house, seizing all
evidence in plain view as they go. 19 7 It is these sorts of intrusions that the Payton arrest
warrant requirement, as well as the holding of Johnson, protect against.
Police should not be allowed to avoid the arrest warrant requirement by seeking
"voluntary cooperation" at the door to the suspect's residence, with all of the additional
intrusions that such a "knock and talk" entails. If the police want to encourage people
to give themselves up voluntarily, they can call on the telephone and invite them to do
so, including calling from a cell phone while positioned directly outside the suspect's
curtilage. Or they can wait for him to come out on his own. In either of these latter two
situations, they will not be able to search inside the house or perform protective sweeps
incident to the arrest, 198 nor obtain special access to the activities inside the house by
192. Id. § 6.1(e), at 303.
193. Id. § 6.1(e), at 304.
194. Id.
195. See supra Part II.A.
196. This would be the "area within his immediate control" prior to the arrest under the
dubious reasoning of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
197. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990). Even when the police arrest someone just
outside his door, the courts are in agreement that, upon reasonable suspicion of danger from
within, they can enter and perform a protective sweep. See, e.g., Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d
810, 820 (3d Cir. 1997). Such reasonable suspicion would rarely arise if the arrest occurred on
the public sidewalk outside the house rather than at the entryway.
198. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1970).
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causing the front door to be opened or by trespassing on the curtilage. Moreover, the
suspect will be dressed for the outside, so it will not be necessary to follow him into the
house while he dresses. Ordinarily, however, as Payton holds, they should come with
an arrest warrant or arrest him outside.
III. SOLUTIONS
At first blush, it is not obviously unreasonable for the police to come to someone's
door and knock on it, like anyone else could do. This explains the universal acceptance
of the "knock and talk" tactic by courts around the country. But as this Article shows,
"knock and talk" repeatedly leads to serious intrusions into the privacy of the
homeowner, and to regular avoidance by police of the arrest and search warrant
requirements. It has also led to widespread confusion among the courts as to precisely
which police behaviors are acceptable and which are prohibited. A number of courts
have expressed serious reservations about various police tactics while continuing to
allow the general "knock and talk" practice.199
This is an area in which police need "clear rules to follow. ' '2°° The current method
of evaluating each case based on the aggressiveness of the police behavior or the
voluntariness of the suspect's cooperation has produced widely divergent and, in my
view, frequently unacceptable results. As the Supreme Court put it in Oliver v. United
States2 1 in adopting the clear rule that "open fields" are outside the scope of the Fourth
Amendment entirely:
Under [the case-by-case] approach, police officers would have to guess before
every search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently high, posted a
sufficient number of warning signs, or located contraband in an area sufficiently
secluded .... The lawfulness of a search would turn on "[a] highly sophisticated
set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs' ands and buts and requiring the drawing
of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions.
' ' 2
Similar remarks could be made about the "knock and talk" cases.
Ordinarily when the Supreme Court declares the need for clear rules for police, it is
on its way to announcing a clear rule that is beneficial to police and detrimental to
203privacy interests. But there is no reason why this must necessarily be so.
Accordingly, I propose, and defend, three relatively clear rules to limit "knock and
talk," in descending order of severity.
199. For examples of some of these types of cases, see supra Part II.
200. Cf Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318,347 (2001) ("Often enough, the Fourth
Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in the heat) of the moment, and the object in
implementing its command of reasonableness is to draw standards sufficiently clear and simple
to be applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing months and years after
an arrest or search is made.").
201. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
202. Id. at 181 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,458 (1981) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (second alteration in original)).
203. See, e.g., Oliver, 466 U.S. 170.
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A. The Outright Ban
Once the police investigation has focused on a particular subject or subjects, the
police should not be allowed to go to their dwelling without a warrant. It does not
matter whether the police's purpose is to question them, to seek consent to search, or to
arrest them. As discussed, once police go onto the front porch of a house, or the
hallway outside an apartment, they are already intruding on the privacy of the
homeowner in a way that other visitors do not.20 4 Police can, of course, acting in their
protective capacity, respond to noise complaints, complaints of fights, etc., because
these either do not involve criminal investigations focused on particular individuals or
are justified by exigent circumstances.205 Likewise it is appropriate for police to
canvass an area following a crime seeking out information from householders as to
what they may have witnessed, since this investigation has not focused on a particular
subject and they are not going, as far as they know, to his dwelling. Finally, if police
have probable cause and exigent circumstances in advance, they can go to dwellings to
arrest and search as usual.
Obviously, such a rule would hamper police investigations, but then, so do the
Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements. It would be much
easier for police to dispense with the inconvenient and demanding warrant requirement
all the time, rather than merely much of the time, as courts currently allow through the
"knock and talk" cases. And stopping and searching cars whenever they felt like it
would likewise be a useful investigative technique for police.
So what would police be allowed to do in a post-"knock and talk" regime? First, as
discussed, they could use the telephone to seek information or consents to search, and
to invite people to surrender to arrest.20 6 While this technique would undoubtedly be
less effective, 20 7 that is because it would lack the unacceptably coercive impact that the
police's physical presence has on the homeowner. Thus the unconcerning line that the
Supreme Court currently draws between consent searches that are "voluntary," even
though obviously induced by police pressure, and those that are involuntary would
become clearer. It is much easier to refuse consent to search your house on the
telephone than it is when the police are looming over you at your front door and thus
204. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
205. What if there is an anonymous tip that someone is being murdered or severely beaten at
a particular address? Since the tip is from an unknown source it is not enough for probable
cause. Exigent circumstances-an exception to the warrant, but not the probable cause
requirement-would not apply. Since this is a true emergency, with lives at stake, I have no
difficulty authorizing the police, acting in their protective capacity, going to the house, knocking
on the door, and even entering without a warrant if they still have reason to believe that the
emergency is ongoing. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (police entry was
reasonable to respond to threat of violence). None of the "knock and talk" cases considered in
this Article involve such an emergency.
206. See supra text accompanying note 195.
207. As Judge Evans put it, concurring in United States v. Johnson: "If the police use a
shortcut and the need to protect themselves arises, they run the risk of not being able to use, in
court, evidence they stumble on.... As I see it, the seeds of this bad search were sown when the
police decided to use the 'knock and talk' technique." 170 F.3d 708, 721 (7th Cir. 1999)
(Evans, J., concurring) (striking down a frisk associated with a "knock and talk").
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more obviously voluntary if you do consent at a distance. Nor would I object to cell
phone calls from the street, outside the curtilage. (Of course, this only works if the
suspect has a phone and the police know the number).20 8
The same can be said for "voluntary" accession to a police request by phone that
you submit to arrest. Many suspects, when faced with the choice of acceding to an
arrest by coming out voluntarily or waiting for the police to enter their home with an
arrest warrant, would still likely choose the former option. Since the suspect does not
encounter the police until he is outside the house, there would be no occasion for the
police to search the interior incident to the arrest or through a protective sweep.20 9 Nor
would it be necessary for the police to go into the house to observe the defendant as he
dressed for the outdoors, as is frequently required when he is arrested at his
doorway.210 If the suspect refuses, the police can surround the house while they go for
a warrant.
It is only "knock and talk" at suspects' homes that is prohibited by this rule. It is
perfectly appropriate to go to the neighbor's house to find out what they know about
the suspect, or to request a view from their yard, in order to obtain probable cause to
put in an arrest or search warrant application (assuming that the investigation is not
aimed at the neighbor as well). But if it turns out that the suspect lives at the location
that the police visit, the burden should be on the government to establish that the police
did not know it.
Similarly, this rule would have no effect on police activities outside the curtilage,
for it is designed to protect the privacy of the home. Thus police can continue to
question, stop and frisk, and arrest people on the street, obtain plain views and smells
from the street, and stop, search, or seek consent to search automobiles, 211 just as they
do now.
A possible source of some confusion in this rule is the "focus" requirement. 21 2 In the
vast majority of cases, it is easy to tell whether the police are making general inquiries
about a crime, or have zeroed in on a particular house or suspect and are knocking and
talking for one of the purposes discussed in this Article. But there are cases, like a
classic murder mystery, where there are a number of people who are possible suspects.
In other words, the police visit is more than a general canvass, but less than an
investigation focused on a particular individual. But to state the problem is to solve it:
no "focus" here. If the crime is one that involves a number ofpeople, then not all these
people can be the focus. When the number of suspects is reduced to two, however,
both are the focus.
208. On the other hand, hailing the suspect with a bullhorn seems too coercive.
209. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). Unless, of course, they had reasonable
suspicion of danger within the house. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 975 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1992); see supra text
accompanying notes 143-45.
211. Though, as indicated earlier, I share with others concems about the "voluntariness" of
consents to search in general. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
212. The "focus" requirement of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491-92 (1964), was
confusing because it would seem that everyone taken in for questioning by the police is a focus
of the investigation. Here it will ordinarily be obvious, when police come to your door, whether
you, or your dwelling, are a focus of the investigation or not.
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I recognize that this is an extreme rule and one that the Supreme Court would be
unlikely to accept. The question is whether any more moderate limitations on "knock
and talk" would work. Perhaps the most obvious one would be a rule forbidding police
with probable cause from using "knock and talk" to avoid the arrest and search warrant
requirements, while allowing police to continue to use "knock and talk" for
investigative purposes.
The difficulty with such an approach is that it would put the police in the unusual
position of arguing that they did not have probable cause to engage in a particular
activity (since if they did they should have gotten a warrant) rather than arguing, as
they now do, that they did.213 It would be easy for police to not disclose all of the
evidence that they had before knocking on someone's door for "investigative purposes"
and then engaging in the same plain view discoveries and consent seeking that they do
now. And, of course, police frequently will not be sure whether their information
amounts to probable cause or not and would understandably seek a "good faith"
exception.214 These issues would lead to endless litigation, which could be avoided by
the simple rule that police are not allowed to go onto your curtilage, including your
front door, at all.
215
B. No Entries, Consents, or Arrests
As currently approved, "knock and talk" investigations achieve two things for the
police. First, they put the police in position to obtain plain views, sounds, and smells
from people's curtilage, as well as getting incriminating answers to questions. Second,
they allow police to avoid the probable cause and warrant requirements by obtaining
consents to search, and to avoid the arrest warrant requirement. (Presumably, an arrest
without probable cause is no good even if one consents to it.) These practices are
apparently widespread, and they undercut the fundamental notion of the Fourth
Amendment that homes are entitled to the special protection of ajudicially authorized
warrant.
A more limited rule would allow "knock and talk," including allowing the police to
obtain information for later use in a warrant. But it would not permit the police to enter
due to exigent circumstances created by the "knock and talk," seek consents, or make
arrests, regardless of whether they had probable cause. If the police want to get in to
search or want to arrest, they must conform to the warrant requirement. Of course,
arrests based on preexisting exigent circumstances, including hot pursuit, would still be
allowed,21 6 as in Santana, but exigent circumstances arising on the spot during a
"knock and talk" would not allow entry, even if the result is that evidence gets flushed
down the toilet. Police should have come with a warrant in the first place if this was a
213. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (abandoning an experiment in which
police were required to do just this as to auto searches by the misbegotten holding inRobbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), which it overruled).
214. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
215. Subject to the canvassing and emergency/protective exceptions noted above. See supra
note 205 and accompanying text.
216. This approach reflects the "only pre-existing exigent circumstances" position of the
Sixth Circuit in United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2005), but adds a "no
consent/arrest seeking" limitation.
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concern. This is similar to the position of the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, but
broader since those circuits seem to require that police "deliberately" create exigent
circumstances to avoid getting a warrant.
2 17
If "knock and talk" is looked upon not as a "right" of the police, but as an exception
to the right of the homeowner not to be disturbed by the police without a warrant, then
it is appropriate to cabin the exception in a way that preserves the warrant requirement.
Whatever may be said of consents to search cars, consents to search homes, and
warrantless arrests in homes should not be allowed, as Johnson suggested.
This rule avoids problems with "focus," since "knock and talk" is to be generally
allowed. It does allow the police to snoop around your house, but this snooping should
be strictly limited to the front porch and door.2t8 It takes care of the most egregious
cases, where police get around the warrant requirement by getting consents to search of
dubious voluntariness. It also avoids warrantless arrests due to "exigent circumstances"
caused by the police's own intrusive behavior or by making the suspect feel that he has
no real choice but to submit. By banning all "knock and talk" consents and arrests, it
necessarily bans the involuntary ones.2 19 In so doing, it resolves the conflicts in the
circuits as to both the exigent circumstance issue (only preexisting exigent
circumstances count) and the scope of the police's arrest power during "knock and
talk"2 0 (no arrest power).
Contrary to an outright ban, this proposal raises questions concerning exigent
circumstances both when evidence is spotted and when there is a threat to police safety.
What are the police to do if a suspect comes to the door with a gun in his belt, or the
police see a gun on a table and another person sitting there?221 The answer must be that
if there is a genuine threat to police safety, then the police must enter to defuse it. But
this is an exigent circumstance created by the "knock and talk," and hence should not
lead to evidence that the police can use in court. If police observe evidence in plain
view from outside during a "knock and talk," they can order the residents out of the
house, or otherwise control them, while they seek a warrant.222
These exigent circumstance problems will arise often and will make this doctrine
much less clear than an outright ban. But it does offer protection against the most
blatant warrant-avoidance tactics of the police.
217. See United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361,367 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[E]xigent circumstances
[must] exist before police decide to knock and announce themselves at the door.") (emphasis in
original). However, the decision in Coles was influenced by the fact that the police had
preexisting probable cause and should have gotten a warrant. Accord Chambers, 395 F.3d 563;
United States v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 2001).
218. Except by telephone, some cases will arise where there is confusion as to which is the
"front" door. Let the police bear the burden of showing that they reasonably believed that the
door they chose was the one the public would use.
219. Since requests for consent or arrest made by phone from outside the curtilage do not
involve "knock and talk," they would also be allowed under this approach.
220. For example, can the police cross the threshold to make an arrest?
221. This question envisions a situation similar to that in Jones, 239 F.3d 716, though in
Jones the other man was seated not at the table but on a couch near the gun.
222. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 332 (2001) (police reasonably prevented
suspect from reentering his trailer while they sought a warrant).
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C. Warnings Required
An even more limited approach would be to simply require warnings to accompany
both requests for consent searches and warrantless arrests.223 That is, police could only
invite people to submit to search or arrest while warning them that they were not
required to acquiesce. It would be appropriate for police to point out that if the suspect
submitted to an arrest and came outside, it would not be necessary for the police to
enter the house, as they would if they came back with an arrest warrant .224 Despite the
Court's rejection of a warning requirement in Schneckloth225 and Drayton,226 which did
not involve residential premises, this would be consistent with the Court's often-
repeated view that homes require special protection.
Such a warning requirement would be better than nothing. However, given the
limited success of the Miranda warnings,22 7 it is unlikely that a warning requirement
would have a significant impact. Arguably, such warnings would be more effective
than the Miranda warnings since a suspect would be more willing to stand up to police
at his home than when he was in custody. A number of "knock and talk" cases
involving refusals to consent, even without warnings, show that such refusals are not
unusual.228 Cutting the other way is that the lines of opposition are more clearly drawn
after one is arrested. Prior to that time, one may still want to appear as though he has
nothing to hide.
CONCLUSION
"Knock and talk" has become a talisman before which the Fourth Amendment
"fades away and disappears. '229 The many cases discussed show that courts are
consistently approving police behavior that intrudes unreasonably upon the privacy of
the home. How to deal with this problem is a difficult question. Hence my suggestion
of three possible remedies, in decreasing order of home-protectiveness, all of which
would limit the intrusiveness of "knock and talk."
223. At least two states, Arkansas and Washington, have this requirement. See Kletter, supra
note 47, at 33.
224. Currently it is unclear whether, if the suspect submits to arrest in the entryway, or steps
outside, the police may search that entryway incident to arrest. It should be made clear that such
cooperative submission means that no search incident or protective sweep inside the house is
allowed, absent reasonable suspicion of danger.
225. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
226. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
227. See generally THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING (Richard A. Leo &
George C. Thomas III eds., 1998) (summarizing studies about the impact of the Miranda
warnings).
228. See, e.g., People v. Pelham, No. F041050, 2003 WL 22026551, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 29, 2003); Redden v. State, 850 N.E.2d 451 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
229. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,461-62 (1971) (plurality opinion).
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